INTRODUCTION THE VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCES is
First, comparisons by veteran status are restricted to a sample of applicants to the military, only about half of whom actually enlist. Nonenlisting applicants probably provide a better control group for veterans than conventional crosssection samples because, like veterans, applicants have indicated a strong interest in military service. Moreover, the data analyzed here contain information on most of the characteristics used by the military to screen applicants. The selection bias induced by military screening can therefore be eliminated using regression techniques or by matching on the covariates used in the screening process.
The second strategy relies on instrumental variables generated by changes in the score scale used to grade the military's entrance exam. When the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was introduced as an applicant screening test in 1976, the score scales unintentionally allowed large numbers of previously unqualified applicants to enter the military. This episode has come to be known as "ASVAB misnorming" because score scales are determined by a process known as test-norming (see, e.g., Maier and Sims (1986) ). After policy makers became aware of the severity of the scoring error, and new score scales were developed and checked for validity, the ASVAB score scale was corrected in late 1980. This correction reduced the probability of acceptance to the military by as much as 30 percent for some low-scoring applicants. Dummy variables indicating the cohorts that applied before the correction therefore provide instruments for the relationship between veteran status and earnings. 4 In addition to estimating the effects of military service, the paper also makes a contribution by illustrating and comparing a number of techniques for nonexperimental evaluation research in models with heterogeneous treatment effects. Section 2 begins by outlining a conceptual framework for evaluation research with heterogeneous potential outcomes. This framework, based on the work of Rubin (1974) , is used to clarify the relationship between regression estimates of average treatment effects and the matching estimator discussed in Rubin (1977) . Instrumental variables (IV) estimates of treatment effects in models with heterogeneous potential outcomes are also discussed. As in Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) , IV estimates are interpreted as local average treatment effects (LATE) that are tied to a specific intervention. In this case, IV is shown to estimate the effect of military service on low-scoring applicants who got into the military solely because they applied before errors in the ASVAB score scale were corrected. The discussion of IV methods in this section extends the original LATE result because it applies to an IV estimator that involves interaction terms in a two-way contrast.5 4The military ordinarily adjusts entrance standards in light of recruiting conditions, but the ASVAB misnorming was a watershed event in the history of the AVF. It has been estimated that one out of three male Army and Air Force recruits between 1976 and 1980 would not have been enlisted under conventional entrance standards (Eitelberg (1988) ; see also Maier and Truss (1983) ). 5See Imbens, Leibman, and Eissa (1997) for a related discussion of differences-in-differences estimators in models with heterogeneous potential outcomes.
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After describing the data in Section 3, the matching and regression estimates are presented in Section 4, and the IV estimates are presented in Section 5. The juxtaposition of results from alternate estimation strategies highlights the fact that matching, regression, and IV estimators potentially uncover different parameters even when the assumptions justifying each approach are valid. In this case, however, the results of all the estimation methods are broadly consistent, suggesting that the mechanisms which link military service to earnings are similar for different groups of veterans. The empirical findings indicate that soldiers who served in the early 1980's were paid considerably more than comparable civilians while in the military and that veterans were more likely to have positive earnings in each year after service. But in spite of this employment gain, military service led to only a modest long-run increase in the civilian earnings of nonwhite veterans while actually reducing the civilian earnings of white veterans, at least in the years following their discharge from service. Another important finding is that for both whites and nonwhites, simple comparisons by veteran status generate misleading overestimates of the effect of military service on civilian earnings.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Matching Estimators
The primary purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of military service on the earnings of veterans. The parameter of interest can be formally described as follows. . In this case, the effect of treatment on the treated is also the average treatment effect in the population subject to randomization and can be estimated by simple comparisons. Rubin (1978) refers to treatment status that is independent of potential outcomes as an ignorable treatment assignment. Although claims for ignorable treatment assignment are usually implausible outside of an experimental setting, it is more plausible that veteran status among applicants is ignorable conditional on a set of observed covariates. In particular, it might be the case that in the pool of military applicants, all of whom have indicated a strong interest in military service by taking the time to undergo a preliminary physical and complete the ASVAB, the principle remaining sources of bias in veteran/nonveteran comparisons are differences in the variables used by the military to screen and select applicants. These variables are age, schooling, and test scores, and they are available in the data set analyzed here.
The assumption that veteran status is ignorable conditional on predetermined covariates, denoted by X, can be expressed using conditional independence notation as follows: ASSUMPTION where the restriction P(D = 1 IX) < 1 refers to the population. In practice, it can happen that some population cells where both treatment and control observations are available nevertheless remain unrepresented in a random sample. In this study, however, the sample was drawn conditional on X. Therefore, sample observations on both veterans and nonveterans are necessarily available wherever the population probability of treatment is neither zero nor one (subject to certain confidentiality restrictions described in the Appendix).
To construct an estimator of ac based on ( In what follows, I refer to a^C as a controlled contrast because it is an estimator that controls for all observed differences between veterans and nonveterans at the time of application. In practice, the observed covariates take on values in the set of all possible combinations of race, application year, 7As noted above, the sample design implies that 8k =[nlk> 0, nOk > 0] equals the population indicator l[Nlk > 0, Nok > 0]. In practice, however, a few cells are missing because of the confidentiality edit.
8Since the sampling scheme conditions on X, the estimator a^ is unbiased as well as consistent. This estimator differs slightly from the estimators discussed by Rubin (1977) Heckman and Robb (1985) ). The next subsection discusses the relationship between a&c and regression estimates of treatment effects.
Regression Estimators
Differences between regression and matching strategies for the estimation of treatment effects are partly cosmetic. While matching methods are often more transparent to nonspecialists, regression estimation is more straightforward to implement when covariates are continuously distributed because matching on continuous covariates requires stratification or pairing (Cochran (1968) ). Note, however, that both methods require a similar sort of approximation since regression on continuous covariates in any finite sample requires functional form restrictions. The fact that both stratification and functional form approximations can be made increasingly accurate as the sample size grows suggests that the manner in which continuous covariates are accommodated is not the most important difference between the two methods.
The essential difference between regression and matching in evaluation research is the weighting scheme used to pool estimates at different values of the covariates. This can be seen by analyzing the matching and regression estimands in a simple example where there is a single binary covariate, x, and the probability of treatment is positive at both values of x. When restriction ( 
Instrumental Variables Estimators
The IV estimates in this paper exploit changes in the probability of enlistment caused by the ASVAB misnorming. When the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was first introduced in 1976, incorrectly normed score scales allowed large numbers of applicants whose true AFQT scores should have disqualified them to enter the military. When the ASVAB score scale was corrected in October, 1980, the probability of enlistment dropped dramatically for applicants whose correctly normed AFQT scores put them in category IV but previously appeared to be in category III. This is because the military tries to minimize the number of category-IV enlistments.12 True high-scorers, however, were largely unaffected by the scoring change because errors in the score scale were concentrated at the low end of the AFQT score distribution.
The simplest way to use the ASVAB misnorming to construct IV estimates is to use application-year dummies as instruments. Conditional on race, year of birth, schooling, and AFQT scores, any remaining effects of application year on earnings are arguably attributable to the large differences in the probability of being accepted for military service on different years caused by misnorming. A problem with this approach is that application year is the same as time-sinceapplication. This variable is very likely related to earnings for reasons other than veteran status, since application to the military typically signals a labor market transition like school completion.
Two approaches are used to control for possible application-year effects. The first exploits the fact that, because three application-year dummies plus interaction terms are available as instruments, a linear trend for time-since-application can be included in the model. The second strategy exploits the fact that application year had almost no effect on applicants with true AFQT scores in score category III. Because of the interaction between application year and AFQT scores, additive application-year effects can also be included as regressors. As in most IV strategies, however, potential outcomes (or the stochastic part of a model for potential outcomes) must be assumed independent of the instruments, conditional on regressors. This independence assumption is the major difference between IV estimation and regression or matching strategies. For the latter two methods to produce valid causal effects, treatment status itself must be independent of potential outcomes conditional on covariates, as described in Assumption 1.
Notation for the IV models is as follows. The interactions between A and S are highlighted in Table III in Section 5 below, which reports enlistment probabilities by year of application and AFQT score group. The table shows a sharp decline in enlistment probabilities for men with AFQT scores in AFQT category IV, but little decline for men with AFQT scores in category IlIb, and no change at all for men with scores in category Illa.13 The easiest way to see how (12) exploits this information is to suppose that W is constant. Equation (12) This is an ignorability assumption for the instrument, similar to Assumption 1, but cast in terms of Y1 -Y0 because of the secular effect of a introduced in Assumption 2. Note that independence of Y1 -Y0 and a is a strong assumption that almost certainly fails to hold during the years when veterans were entering and leaving the military. On the other hand, the matching estimates reported below suggest that this may be a reasonable assumption for earnings after 1985.
The last assumption in this setup imposes a monotonicity restriction involving both potential treatment assignments and the covariate s, which plays a special role here because men with s = 0 are used to identify the effect of a in the model for Y0:
This assumption requires the interaction between application year and test scores to operate in a unidirectional manner. When s = 1, i.e., for low-scoring men, Assumption 4 implies D, > Do with probability one as in the usual case. But when s = 0, i.e., for high-scoring men, Assumption 4 implies that application year has no effect on veteran status, or D1 = Do. It is this restriction that allows the use of application year contrasts for high scoring men to control for application year differences that are not attributable to military service. The monotonicity captured in Assumption 4 is clearly stronger than univariate monotonicity. On the other hand, it has testable implications that are easily checked. For example, Table III (16) is that aOv can be interpreted as an average treatment effect for the subpopulation affected by the "experiment" embodied in application year. In particular, IV estimates capture the effect of military service on these low-scoring men whose treatment status was potentially affected by application year (i.e., DI > DO). Note that the population with s = 1 and D1 > Do does not include all veterans (D = 1), all low scorers (s = 1), or even all veterans with s = 1, because there are many veterans with low AFQT scores who would have served regardless of when they applied. On the other hand, like the controlled contrast, ac, the parameter aOI captures the effect of treatment on a well-defined subpopulation that was subjected to treatment.
Finally, note that the IV estimates reported below are actually more complicated than the sample analog of aOI in (15) in two ways. First, the reported estimates implicitly use more than one instrument because estimation of equations (11) and (12) involve multiple application-year/score-group contrasts.14 Second, there are exogenous covariates other than AFQT scores. A version of (16) can easily be developed to handle these modifications, however. IV estimators with many covariates implicitly combine simple estimators like awI in a variance-weighted average, in the same way that regression produces a variance-weighted average of covariate-specific estimates. Similarly, IV estimators that use more than one instrument pool the full set of underlying single-instrument estimators with weights proportional to the effect of each instrument on the treatment dummy. See Angrist and Imbens (1995) for details.
DATA DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISONS BY VETERAN STATUS
To estimate the effect of voluntary military service on earnings, I combined administrative data from the US military with earnings data from the Social Security Administration (SSA). The military data come from Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) files containing information on applicants and entrants to the military for each fiscal year.15 The applicant records report information collected at the time of application, including basic demographic variables, physical examination results, and test scores. Applicant records do not indicate whether an applicant eventually enlists and enters the military. Instead, the act of enlistment generates a new record in the DMDC's computerized filing 14 Estimates using a single instrument were reported in an earlier version of this paper (Angrist (1995) 1993a) ). After matching applicant records to information on entrants, a random sample from the resulting data set was matched to SSA earnings histories. The sample matched to earnings was limited to men aged 17-22 who applied during calendar years 1976-82, had valid sex and race codes, data on Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores collected on certain ASVAB test forms,16 and at least a 9th grade education but no more than a 4-year college degree. The target population contains 2.2 million white men and 900,000 nonwhite men. The sample drawn from this population contains roughly 750,00 applicants, half of whom are nonwhite. Conditional on race, over 90 percent of this sample is self-weighting, but some groups were over-sampled to satisfy SSA confidentiality requirements. The overall sample size was determined by the SSA. Additional information about the sample design is provided in the data appendix.
The SSA keeps track of the earnings of all workers covered by Social Security in a data base called the Summary Earnings Record (SER). SSA programmers were able to locate earnings records for 697,944 applicants in the full sample of 753,095. Data on Social Security taxable earnings were then added to the applicant sample, generating a micro data set containing information collected at the time of application, veteran status, and Social Security earnings for each year from 1974 through 1991.
SSA earnings data have a number of limitations. First, the SER records a zero for any individual without earnings from covered employment in a given year. However, almost all nongovernmental employees are covered by the main Social Security programs, OASDI (old-age, survivors, and disability insurance), and HI (Medicare).17 Zeros in the SER may also be attributable to the fact that earnings information is recorded by the SSA with a lag.'8 Another limitation of SSA data is that earnings records for each year are censored at the maximum amount subject to FICA taxation (the "taxable maximum") for that year. Since 1980, however, at least 90 percent of all employee earnings have been reported to the Social Security Administration. Over 85 percent of employee plus selfemployment earnings have been reported, and over 85 percent of covered male workers have earnings that fall below the taxable maximum (US Department of Health and Human Services (1993, Tables 3.B2 and 4.B2)).
Another limitation is that the SSA does not release individual earnings data to researchers. The micro data set linking 697,644 military applicants to their 16 The applicant population was restricted to those tested on ASVAB Form 5/6/7 or later so that AFQT scores would be roughly comparable across years, and because this form was the first used extensively in the ASVAB testing program (Maier and Truss (1983) earnings was therefore used to produce a data set containing average earnings for each of 8,760 cells defined by race, year of application, AFQT score group, veteran status, schooling level at the time of application, year of birth, and a variable for applicants in 1977-78 that was not used in this project. The released data set contains cell-identifiers for the 5,654 cells with 25 or more observations in the population, along with the average FICA earnings in these cells for 1974-91.19 Additional earnings variables for each cell include standard deviations, the fraction with zero earnings, and the fractions with earnings at or above the taxable maximum.20 The data released by the SSA were also subject to a confidentiality-edit that masks some or all of the earnings variables in small cells in the sample. This confidentiality edit is described in the data appendix, which also provides additional information on FICA coverage. In what follows, I refer to the released data set as the DMDC-SER matched sample.
Descriptive Statistics
The 18 when they applied to the military, 25 percent were aged 19, and 16 percent were aged 20. A total of 40 percent of applicants in the sample were high school graduates, 4 percent were GED certified, and 34 percent had completed 11th grade only. Out of nearly 700,000 applicants in the sample, only 739 were college graduates. In 1979, 67 percent of white applicants and 78 percent of nonwhite applicants had AFQT scores in categories III and IV, corresponding to the 10th through 64th percentiles of the AFQT reference population.
Earnings Profiles
Average earnings profiles for cohorts defined by application-year are shown in Figure 1 . The profiles exhibit a high rate of initial earnings growth, with declining and even negative growth rates later.22 This concavity is familiar from cross-section studies in labor economics. In this case, however, at least part of the decline in earnings growth at the end of sample period is attributable to the lags with which data on earnings are recorded in the SER. Another feature of the profiles is the dip in earnings growth around 1980-82. This is a business cycle effect that appears to have hit earlier applicants the hardest. The profiles also show an increase in the rate of earnings growth in the year of application. 
Employment Rates
The Social Security earnings data analyzed here include observations of zero earnings. An alternate use of Social Security data, originally suggested by Card 23 The main benefit for schooling in 1976-82 was the Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP), which offered benefit levels considerably lower than those offered under the Post-Korean GI Bill. Beginning in 1979, however, the individual services (especially the Army) began to offer a range of additional benefits which, in combination with VEAP, approached the benefit levels in previous and later programs (Angrist (1993b) veterans differently from nonveterans. Moreover, the earnings records used here were last updated in 1992 and should be largely complete through 1989.
To provide an empirical assessment of filing delay and coverage problems, I drew an extract from the 1990 Census 5 Percent Public Use Microdata Sample (Bureau of the Census (1993)) that is roughly comparable with the sample used here. The Census extract includes over 900,000 men aged 24-33 in 1990, who were US citizens and had at least a ninth grade education. Of the whites in this sample, 13.5 percent are veterans. The corresponding figure for nonwhites is 17.6 percent. The Census was chosen for comparison because, unlike most US surveys, it includes data on active-duty military personnel. A drawback of the Census is that there is no way to limit the sample to those who applied for military service. 
MATCHING AND REGRESSION ESTIMATES
Matching Estimates
Because the DMDC-SER sample is confined to applicants to the AVF, comparisons of earnings by veteran status such as those in Table II control 
Additional Matching Estimates
A simple but important check on the matching estimates is to see whether the pattern of estimates by application year matches the expected timing of entry and discharge from military service for applicants who applied in different years. We have already seen that pre-application year differences by veteran status are small even in uncontrolled comparisons, so that the pre-application contrast is obviously not a foolproof specification test. But the time series of treatment effects by application year contains additional information of interest, such as changing effects as veterans are discharged from the military and reenter the civilian labor market. 2 0 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimates of a&c by application year, plotted in Figure 3 for both race groups, show that a&c is close to zero until the year of application, at which time there is a sharp break. This break is especially well-defined for nonwhite applicants. After the break, veterans earn considerably more than nonveterans for a few years, while subsequent declines in a&c are spaced at one-year intervals, beginning in 1983 for 1979 applicants. This suggests that the estimates of a&c reflect a staggered return to civilian life by most of the veterans in each cohort, since the median length of service for men in this sample is between 3 and 4 years. The VOLUNTARY MILITARY SERVICE 273 negative veteran effects for whites in the years when they were leaving the military may be due in part to college attendance. Note, however, that these negative effects persist through 1990.
Another feature of interest in Figure 3 is the modest dip in earnings for some cohorts just before the year of application. Similar pre-program declines in earnings have been observed in studies of subsidized training programs (Ashenfelter (1978) , Ashenfelter and Card (1985) ) and are a potential source of bias in nonexperimental evaluations. Because earnings are serially correlated, transient negative shocks could have a lasting impact on veteran-nonveteran contrasts. But the small pre-application declines in earnings observed in Figure  3 seem unlikely to have imparted any substantial bias in the estimates for later years.
Finally, note that Figure 3 suggests that by 1986, after the majority of veterans in this sample would have left the military, the effects of military service are similar across application years. This is important because, as noted in Section 2.3, the causal interpretation of the IV estimates turns partly on the assumption that treatment effects are independent of the instruments (application year dummies) conditional on AFQT score group and other covariates. Estimates of a,,, denoted a',, were computed by weighted least squares using population cell counts (NDk) as weights. This weighting scheme, when applied to grouped data, produces the same estimates as would be generated using micro data weighted by inverse sampling rates.
Regression Estimates
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In Section 2, a,' was shown to be a conditional-variance-weighted average of covariate-specific treatment effects, whereas ac weights covariate-specific effects by the proportion of veterans at each value of X. In practice, the regression and matching estimates are almost identical through 1984. This can be seen in Table II , which reports a',' as well as a&c for each year. In contrast with the 1974-84 results, however, regression estimates for each year after 1984 are larger than the corresponding matching estimates. The largest difference is roughly 250 dollars, for the earnings of nonwhites in 1991. This is equal to about 25 percent of the corresponding matching estimate. Because the regression and matching estimates are highly correlated, the difference in the two estimates is precisely measured, with a standard error of about 20 dollars for the 1991 earnings of nonwhites.29 Differences between a,' and ac for earlier years, and for the earnings of whites, are estimated with equal or better precision.
The divergence between regression and matching estimates after 1984 is probably explained by differences in the long term impact of military service on men with covariate values that place them in low-probability-of-service and high-probability-of-service groups. This can be seen in Figure 4 , which plots estimated treatment effects for average 1988-91 earnings conditional on probability of service (grouped into 7.5 point intervals). There is a strong negative relationship between treatment effects and the probability of service for both race groups. The matching estimator gives the small covariate-specific estimates for men with high probabilities of service the most weight, while the larger covariate-specific estimates for men with low probability of service are given less weight. The regression estimator, in contrast, gives more weight to covariatespecific estimates where the probability of military service conditional on covariates is close to one-half. This leads to a higher overall treatment effect.
ESTIMATION USING THE ASVAB MISNORMING
The estimates in Section 3 control for the major characteristics used by the military to screen applicants to the Armed Forces. It should be noted, however, that a large fraction of the applicants who do not enlist nevertheless appear to qualify for enlistment (Berryman, Bell, and Lisowski (1983) ). This raises the possibility that even after controlling for observed covariates, potential earnings might not be independent of veteran status. The possibility of selection bias in the matching estimates motivates an IV strategy that relies on different identifying assumptions. The source of identifying information underlying these estimates are the changes in the probability of enlistment for applicants with low Table III , which shows that AFQT-IV applicants were as much as 29 percentage points less likely to enlist if they applied in 1981-82 than in 1979-80. In contrast, enlistment probabilities for AFQT-JJJ applicants changed little.
AFQT scores documented in
IV estimates of the effect of veteran status were constructed by replacing E[YI W= Wk, S, A] with the corresponding sample mean in equations (11) and (12) using a weighted least squares procedure described in the Appendix. There is no need to use sample estimates for E[D IW = Wk, S, A] because this proportion is known from population cell counts. In view of the requirement that treatment effects be independent of application years (Assumption 3), earnings data were dropped for each application-year cohort in that cohort's year of application, and data on the earnings of cohorts observed before the year of application were not pooled with data on the earnings of cohorts observed after the year of application.
The IV estimates of a* in equation (11) larger than the matching and regression estimates. Also, like the matching and regression estimates, the IV estimates for the earnings of whites after 1982 are almost all negative, though not significantly different from zero. Note, however, that the IV estimates suggest that long-run employment effects may be zero or negative while the matching and regression estimators generate small positive effects. In contrast with the negative long-run effects for whites, the IV estimates of equation (11) Overall, the IV estimates suggest that the long-run consequences of military service may be even smaller than indicated by the matching estimates. For example, the IV estimates for whites show small negative employment effects while the corresponding matching estimates show small, though statistically significant, positive effects. Similarly, for nonwhites, the IV estimates of employment effects, while still positive, are smaller than the matching estimates. Moreover, unlike the matching estimates, which show modest positive effects on the earnings of nonwhites, one of the IV specifications for nonwhites (equation (12)) leads to negative and insignificant earnings effects. There are at least three possible-and not mutually exclusive-explanations for the differences between the IV and matching estimates. First, the matching estimates may still be biased upwards because Assumption 1 fails to hold. For example, in addition to the covariates used here, applicants may use other information about their civilian labor market prospects when making enlistment decisions. Second, the identifying assumptions upon which the IV estimates are based may fail to be satisfied. In either of these two cases, there is no reason for the IV and matching estimates to be related in any particular way. Third, while the matching estimates capture the effect of military service on the entire population of veterans, the theorem in Section 2.3 shows that the IV estimates characterize the impact of treatment on a group that is not necessarily representative of the population of veterans or even of the population of low-scoring veterans. In particular, the IV estimates capture the effect of treatment on men with low scores who get into the military because of misnorming.
Men who get into the military with low test scores typically do so in spite of these scores. In contrast, men who got into the military because of the ASVAB misnorming are men with low test scores whom the military would have excluded if their true scores had been known (these are men with s = 1 and D1 > Do). On one hand, in light of the covariate-specific estimates in Figure 4 , the fact that this group has low scores suggests that they should benefit more from military service than the entire population of veterans. On the other hand, unlike other low-scoring veterans, conditional on having low AFQT scores they were not actually qualified for military service. Some studies suggest that such unqualified recruits were less likely to complete their initial tour of duty, get promoted, reenlist, or obtain an honorable discharge (see, e.g., Heisey, Means, and Laurence (1985) , Cooke and Quester (1992) ). These factors may have reduced any long-run labor market benefits from militaiy service.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main empirical findings are summarized in Table V , which reports differences-in-means, matching, regression, and IV estimates of the effects of veteran status on earning and employment for selected post-application years. The last application year in the sample is 1982. In 1983, when most of the veterans studied here were still in the military, all but one of the estimates (IV-1 for whites) suggest that veterans earned more than nonveterans, and all of the estimates show that veterans were more likely to be employed. In 1984-87, when many veterans were reentering the civilian labor market, white veterans were actually earning less than comparable nonveterans. This finding is consistent across all estimation methods and contradicts simple comparisons by veteran status, which show white veterans earning more than nonveterans in these years. In contrast with the negative estimates for the 1984-87 earnings of whites, most of the estimates for the 1984-87 earnings of nonwhites are positive, although one IV estimate is negative and very close to zero. By 1988-91, when most veterans were no longer in the military, the earnings of white veterans and nonveterans appear to have converged. But most of the estimates suggest that nonwhite veterans may have enjoyed an earnings advantage through the end of the sample period, and all of the estimates suggest at least a small employment advantage for nonwhites. Although the long-run earnings effects for nonwhites are estimated to be less than 10 percent of average earnings, the finding of some long-run labor market benefits for nonwhite veterans stands in contrast with earlier negative results for veterans of the misnorming era (Lawrence, Ramsberger, and Gribben (1989)). The possibility of modest earnings benefits for nonwhite veterans should be taken into account by policy-makers concerned about the social cost of military downsizing. On the other hand, claims that blacks who serve in the military have enjoyed unparalled labor market benefits (see, e.g., Moskos and Butler (1996) ) are not supported by the findings reported here. Even among applicants, simple comparisons by veteran status clearly exaggerate the effect of military service. The true long-run earnings effect seems to be on the order of the benefit from between one and two years of extra schooling, an alternative career-development option that is likely to be available to most applicants for military service.
Results from each of the estimation methods summarized in Table V have been interpreted as average causal effects that are valid for various groups in the population of veterans. Under the assumption that veteran status is ignorable conditional on the covariates used by the military to select from the applicant pool, the matching and regression estimators produce weighted averages of covariate-specific average treatment effects. The weighting schemes differ and regression does not, in general, estimate the effect of treatment on the treated. IV estimates also have a weighted average interpretation, but this average applies to a narrower group than either the regression or matching estimates. In this case, the IV estimates are for a group of low-scoring applicants that would have been disqualified if the military had accurate test scores; men in this group may have benefited less from military selvice than other low-scoring applicants.
The discussion in this paper highlights the fact that in evaluation research there is generally no single treatment effect of interest. In the absence of a theory explaining the response to treatment, researchers should expect methods that exploit different sources of variation to produce different results. On the other hand, except for the simple comparison of means, the estimators used here generate broadly similar results. This suggests that simple economic mechanisms may explain the coarse pattern of treatment effects. In this case, positive effects on the earnings of AVF veterans in the early eighties seem to be explained by the fact that veterans were insulated from a major cyclical downturn while in the military. The proximate cause for any longer-term positive effects on earnings would seem to be an increase in employment rates, explained perhaps by continued military service and the hiring preferences enjoyed by veterans in the public sector. 
where
-is the average earnings in the jth cell defined by W, S, and A; pj is the probability of military service in the jth cell; and fj is a restricted cell effect that may include a parametric function of A but excludes interactions between A and S. The data were aggregated to the level of cell j using population frequency counts. For the purposes of estimation, a * was assumed to be constant, so that the efficient estimator of (A.8) is weighted least squares using the reciprocal of the variance of ij as weights. In this case, the cell residual variance is also the variance of the dependent variable because the pj are known population proportions and Ij is fixed within cells. The asymptotic covariance matrix of the resulting weighted least squares estimator can be derived directly or as the limiting distribution of a two-sample instrumental variables estimator in the special case where the moments from the first sample are yj and the moments from the second sample ( 
